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Abstract—With the expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT),
the number of security incidents due to insecure and mis-
configured IoT devices is increasing. Especially on the con-
sumer market, manufacturers focus on new features and early
releases at the expense of a comprehensive security strategy.
Hence, experts have started calling for regulation of the IoT
consumer market, while policymakers are seeking for suitable
regulatory approaches. We investigate how manufacturers can
be incentivized to increase sustainable security efforts for IoT
products. We propose mandatory security update labels that
inform consumers during buying decisions about the willingness
of the manufacturer to provide security updates in the future.
Mandatory means that the labels explicitly state when security
updates are not guaranteed. We conducted a user study with
more than 1,400 participants to assess the importance of security
update labels for the consumer choice by means of a conjoint
analysis. The results show that the availability of security updates
(until which date the updates are guaranteed) accounts for 8%
to 35% impact on overall consumers’ choice, depending on the
perceived security risk of the product category. For products
with a high perceived security risk, this availability is twice as
important as other high-ranked product attributes. Moreover,
provisioning time for security updates (how quickly the product
will be patched after a vulnerability is discovered) additionally
accounts for 7% to 25% impact on consumers’ choices. The
proposed labels are intuitively understood by consumers, do
not require product assessments by third parties before release,
and have a potential to incentivize manufacturers to provide
sustainable security support.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Kevin Ashton coined the term ‘Internet of
Things’ [1] as the headline of a marketing presentation that
promoted an idea of utilizing radio-frequency identification
(RFID) in supply chains. By now, Internet of Things evolved
into a major technological paradigm: everyday items, house-
hold appliances, and mobile devices are interconnected via
wireless networks and the Internet. Gartner [2] predicts that
the majority of IoT devices, 12.9 billion units (63%), will be
installed in the consumer sector by 2020, and thus, consumer
products play a prominent role in the expansion of the IoT.
Recent academic and industrial user studies [3]–[6] doc-
ument various security concerns regarding the usage of IoT
products. At least since the denial-of-service attacks against
Internet infrastructure by the Mirai botnet [7] in 2016, security
experts have started to demand regulatory interventions. “Our
choice isn’t between government involvement and no gov-
ernment involvement”, says Bruce Schneier in his testimony
before a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives [8],
“Our choice is between smarter government involvement and
stupider government involvement”. Current policy approaches
in the U.S. include a bill for establishing guidelines for the ac-
quisition of secure IoT products by governmental agencies [9]
as well as a Californian bill [10] obligating manufacturers to
equip IoT devices with reasonable security features. In the
EU, baseline security recommendations for IoT were published
by the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) [11]. A task force from academia, industry,
and societal organizations proposed a policy for vulnerability
disclosure in the EU that also concerns IoT products [12].
The deficient IoT security can be at least partly attributed to
missing economic incentives for manufacturers. To be success-
ful on the market, manufacturers have to attract consumers and
complementers [13], [14]. Consumers reward an early market
entry and new functional features, while complementers favor
systems that allow easy compatibility with their products.
These demands contradict the security design that usually adds
complexity to systems. In addition, releasing an innovative
product to the market requires many resources, and since
resources are finite, they are withdrawn from non-functional
features, such as comprehensive security mechanisms [15].
The missing incentives for securing IoT consumer products
originate from the consumers’ inability to compare security
properties of different products. The concept of an asymmetric
information barrier between buyers and sellers, which also
affects other properties, such as energy consumption and
product quality, is known in the economic theory as ‘the
market for lemons’ [16]. This theory states that consumers
are not willing to pay a price premium for something they
cannot measure. In fact, even manufacturers might not have
the complete knowledge about the strength of their products’
security [14]. Reasons might be a lack of experience in
designing Internet-connected technologies or the outsourcing
of a product’s security development to original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs).
Contributions: Firstly, we propose and examine mandatory
security update labels, a novel idea for a regulatory framework
that complements ongoing regulation efforts. We do not call
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for security testing and certification to keep “insecure” prod-
ucts off the market. Instead, we explore to which extent market
forces can be utilized to elicit manufacturers to sustainably
support their products’ software with security updates. Secu-
rity update labels enable an informed choice regarding security
properties of IoT consumer products. They transform the
asymmetric information about the manufacturer’s willingness
to provide security updates into two intuitively assessable and
comparable product attributes: availability period, i.e., for how
long the manufacturer guarantees to provide security updates
(e.g., ‘until 12/2016’), as well as provisioning time, i.e., within
which timeframe after a vulnerability notification a security
patch is provided (e.g., ‘within 30 days’). These labels are
inspired by established regulations, such as energy labels.
Secondly, we empirically examine the impact of security
update labels on the consumers’ choice. Although security
patching is discussed by experts as one of the most effective
countermeasure against insecure IoT devices, the impact of
guaranteeing security updates on the consumers’ decisions has
not been empirically assessed so far. We conducted a user
study with more than 1,400 participants that measured the
relative importance of the availability period and provisioning
time of security updates for buying decisions. To this end, we
used conjoint analysis, a well-established method in marketing
research [17], [18], which has also been used in courts to
calculate damages of patent and copyright infringements [19].
In a nutshell, a number of fictitious product profiles, each
described by a set of attributes, is shown to respondents in
multiple iterations. They are asked which of the presented
products they would prefer to buy (with the option to refuse
buying any of the products). Based on these choice results,
conjoint analysis determines a preference model that measures
the relative importance and utility of each attribute.
Study Results: We found that the guarantee of providing
security updates has a high impact on buying decisions. We
examined two product categories, one with a high and one
with a low perceived security risk. Among all assessed product
attributes, the availability period of security updates was the
most important one: For the product with the high perceived
security risk, its relative importance on the overall consumers’
choice of 31% is at least twice as high as the importance of
other attributes. For the product with the low perceived secu-
rity risk, availability had a lower relative importance of 20%
for the consumers’ choice. Additionally, consumers prefer a
shorter provisioning time (10 days) over a longer provisioning
time (30 days), and dislike longer provisioning times for
products with a high perceived security risk. Demographic
characteristics play a minor role, while the sensitivity for
security risks has an impact on the consumers’ choice.
With this work, we address policymakers and security
researchers that are seeking for promising directions to foster
sustainable security efforts for IoT consumer products.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We provide background and related work on product label-
ing and conjoint analysis in this section.
A. Product Labeling
Product labeling is used in many countries to inform con-
sumers about intangible features of products and to enable
product comparison during buying decisions. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) issues product labeling policies
in the USA, while each member state of the EU runs its
own institution that enforces regulations defined by the EU
Commission. Prominent examples are energy labels. In the
USA, energy labels were introduced in 2007 [20] by the FTC
and show the energy consumption and the estimated annual
operating costs. In 2010, The EU followed with a similar
approach by introducing the Energy Efficiency Directive [21].
Prior research on the effectiveness of energy labeling [22]–[24]
concluded that consumers are aware of these labels, understand
them, and that energy labels influence consumers’ buying
decisions.
In 2017, the German government [25] evaluated an idea
of lifetime labels on electronic products. Their label design
showed a color-gradient lifespan between 0 (red) and 20
(green) years. In a user study with a representative sample,
discrete-choice experiments (but not conjoint analysis) simu-
lated online shopping scenarios. The results showed that while
the lifespan attribute was recognized by consumers, its impact
on buying decisions was less than the impact of other product
attributes, e.g., price and brand. Their label did not concern
security features, but the functional lifespan of a product.
B. Security & Privacy Labels and Regulatory Approaches
In the academic research, the adaption of product labels
for privacy information was examined in user studies. Kelley
et al. [26], [27] investigated whether food nutrition labels
can be adapted to make privacy policies of websites more
understandable. Tsai et al. [28] evaluated whether consumers
would pay a higher price for a product offered by an online
shop with a strict privacy policy as compared to a less privacy-
protecting shop. Their results suggest that consumers are
willing to pay a price premium for higher privacy if privacy
information is salient and understandable.
Independently and concurrently to our work, Emami-Naeini
et al. [6] developed a security and privacy label for IoT
consumer products. In contrast to our proposal, their label
includes ratings that require third-party product testing before
release. They tested their label in an interview study with 24
users and a survey with 200 respondents. Emami-Naeini et
al. did not conduct a conjoint analysis but directly asked the
users to rate the importance of security and privacy on their
buying decisions. They concluded that importance of security
and privacy depends on the product category: whereas they are
important when buying a home camera or a smart thermostat,
they are not important when buying a smart toothbrush. We
found a similar effect in our study. Our and their studies
complement and validate each other’s results using different
methods.
Mandatory security update labels represent a possible ap-
proach to regulate the IoT product market with regard to
security. Chattopadhyay et al. [29] consider this economic
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problem in more depth and analyze the impact of various
regulation strategies on consumers’ behavior.
C. Conjoint Analysis
Conjoint analysis is one of the major methods to measure
the impact of product attributes on the consumers’ buying
decisions [30]. The basic idea of conjoint analysis is that
respondents are asked to state their preference for buying
fictitious products. The product profiles are described by a
limited set of attributes, e.g., size, color, and price. All further
attributes of the product are assumed to be constant.
There are different types of conjoint analysis. Among them,
choice-based conjoint (CBC) is used in 79% of the conjoint
surveys [31]. In CBC, which we use in this work as well,
the respondents receive multiple (usually randomly generated)
subsets of 3 to 5 product profiles (so-called choice sets), of
which they select the most desirable product.
Considering the overall preference (i.e., combination of all
buying decisions) as dependent variable and the attributes
of the product as independent variables, a conjoint analysis
assesses the relative importance of product’s attributes. For
example, relative importance of the attribute ‘color’ for buying
decisions can be assessed. Conjoint analysis also evaluates the
importance of the different characteristics of a single attribute,
e.g., whether the change of a product’s color would have
positive or negative effects on the consumers’ choice.
In the past decades, conjoint analysis has been applied to
numerous commercial projects [32] and is by far the most
widely-used methodology in marketing research to analyze
consumer trade-offs in buying decisions [17]. Conjoint anal-
ysis is also used in other areas, e.g., to assess the patients’
preferences in the healthcare sector [33]. Furthermore, it is a
recognized methodology to calculate damages of patent and
copyright infringement in court cases [19]. A famous example
was Apple’s $2.5 billion law suit against Samsung, in which
Apple estimated the financial damages of the alleged patent
infringement based on conjoint analysis [34].
Conjoint analysis has also previously been used to investi-
gate the effects of product labels [35]–[37] on the consumers’
choice. Sammer and Wu¨stenhagen [38] analyzed the impact of
energy labels on the buying decisions concerning light bulbs
and washing machines of Swiss consumers. However, we are
the first to use conjoint analysis to assess the importance of a
security-related label.
III. SECURITY LABELS FOR CONSUMERS
Inspired by the success of existing product labels, we pro-
pose a label that enables users to compare security properties
during buying decisions. We present the idea of a regulatory
framework that accompanies the label, and discuss concerns
that finally motivate the user study.
A. Security Scales for Labeling
Learning from the success of the energy labeling initiatives,
we asked how we can use a similar approach for security. First
of all, an appropriate scale to measure security properties is
required. We need a security scale that
1) can be intuitively understood by consumers, even if they
have no security expertise;
2) enables them to easily compare products, as comparison
lays the foundation for the choice between products;
3) and finally, does not require third-party product testing
for market release.
The last requirement is based on the following considera-
tions: Third-party testing is a long and costly procedure that
might considerably delay the release of a new product. This
involves the danger that manufacturers would choose testing
laboratories that perform a relaxed and fast evaluation [39],
[40], which again could lead to a false sense of security.
In prior work, a number of security scales has been proposed
that could be applied to IoT products. Many of them (e.g., [41],
[42]) are based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [43] and used to categorize the seriousness and impact
of existing security vulnerabilities. Although CVSS can serve
as an indicator of future security properties, it cannot solely
measure the current level of product security, as it is based on
past vulnerability records.
The time-to-compromise (TTC) [44] scale originated from
the concept of the working time required to break a physical
safe. In terms of IoT consumer products, this metric could
measure the time it takes to break the security mechanisms of
a product. According to our criteria, TTC is not applicable as
it requires a third party to assess the product’s security.
A security scale might also show levels of a security certi-
fication scheme. However, besides the need for a third party,
security certification is not suitable to communicate security
levels to consumers, as it might be misleading: Whereas
consumers may assume that the whole product is certified, in
reality only a subset of the components might be certified [39].
B. Security Update Labels
We conclude that, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no suitable approaches to communicate the security level of
an IoT product to consumers. And even if manufacturers
would implement comprehensive security measures, security
flaws in IoT products cannot be fully prevented. Prior research
[45], [46] concluded that well-engineered code has an average
defect rate of around 2 defects per 1,000 lines of code. If we
accept the possibility of security vulnerabilities even in well-
designed systems, the best approach would be to continuously
support the repair of such defects as soon as they are disclosed.
We propose a regulatory framework that demands brand-
giving manufacturers to define an update policy for each IoT
consumer product with the following properties:
Availability period: The availability of security updates de-
termines the absolute timeframe in which the manufacturer
ensures the patching of security vulnerabilities in the prod-
uct’s software. In other words, it defines until which date
(for example: ‘12/2024’) the manufacturer contractually
warrants to provide security updates.
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Provisioning time: When a security vulnerability in the soft-
ware of an IoT consumer product was reported, the manu-
facturer has to investigate this issue and patch the software
if needed. The update policy defines the maximum time-
frame (for example: ‘30 days’) within which the manufac-
turer guarantees to provide software security updates.
Both attributes must be printed as a security update label
on each adequate product such that consumers can compare
this information when making a buying decision. The label
content does not need to be authorized by a third party before
the market release, similarly to the mandatory energy labels. If
a manufacturer refuses to guarantee security updates, the label
should explicitly display ‘no security updates guaranteed’ or
a similar phrase.
C. An Idea for a Regulatory Framework
Following the example of the legislations for energy la-
beling [21], [47], market surveillance and consumer protec-
tion authorities should supervise the implementation of the
security update labels, and conduct promotional and educa-
tional information campaigns in the introduction phase. We
propose that each applicable product displays the label on
the packaging, such that it can be considered and compared
during buying decisions, and on the device itself to inform
the consumer about the guaranteed availability of security
updates after deployment. These labels should be mandatory
for each consumer product that is able to directly or indirectly
(e.g., over Bluetooth) connect to the Internet. The liability
should be enforced only between the brand-giving company
that is responsible for the definition of the update policy,
and the buyer of the product. All further interactions between
the brand-giving company and OEMs or other involved third
parties should be regulated by the market.
The vulnerability disclosure can be implemented in many
ways. An approach might be to set up a public vulnerability
reporting platform. This platform could ensure the documen-
tation of the reported vulnerabilities and would act as an
information channel where the manufacturer announces the
current state of the vulnerability handling to the affected
consumers and policy-enforcing entities. The design of such
a reporting platform could follow the proposal of the Centre
for European Policy Studies [12, p.56] and is out of scope
of this paper. Procedures could be implemented based on the
established standards for responsible vulnerability disclosure,
e.g., ISO/IEC 29147 [48], and vulnerability handling, e.g.,
ISO/IEC 30111 [49]. When a suspected security vulnerability
is found, the reporting entity files a vulnerability report via this
platform, which in turn informs the affected manufacturers.
After receiving the vulnerability report, the time-to-patch clock
starts and the manufacturer investigates whether the vulnera-
bility can be reproduced. If the manufacturer concludes that
the reported vulnerability is an actual security flaw, a security
patch shall be developed and provided within the guaranteed
provisioning time. We propose that consumers have a right to
compensation in the following cases:
• The manufacturer does not provide a required security patch
within the guaranteed provisioning time.
• The manufacturer provides a security patch, but the patch
does not fix the bug, introduces other security problems, or
has serious effects on the performance of the product.
For the cases of disputes about the effectiveness of provided
updates or whether a bug requires a security patch, policy-
makers should establish an entity that enforces accountability,
judges the claims of the consumers, protects vulnerability
reporters, and has the power to sanction manufacturers, simi-
larly to the sanctions imposed by the General Data Protection
Regulations (GDPR) in the EU [50, Art.58].
D. Concerns towards Security Update Labels
The proposal of security update labels might raise the
following concerns.
1) Ineffectiveness: Some security vulnerabilities cannot be
patched with updates. For example, a security flaw in the spec-
ification of an interconnected system might demand changes in
other components that are not maintained by the manufacturer,
or the hardware platform of the affected product cannot
support the patched software due to memory or computational
power constraints. In this case, the proposed label strengthens
consumer rights as the consumer is entitled to compensation.
2) Misuse: Manufacturers might be motivated to spend
even less resources on security of their products before re-
leasing them. They might decide that they always can patch
the product within a certain timeframe, which means that they
simply could outsource the debugging of their products to
the consumers. We believe that such behavior would damage
the user acceptance and the brand image. Furthermore, this
practice would lead to a high pressure on the manufacturers
to deliver numerous security patches within limited time.
In another scenario, manufacturers might try to transfer the
liability regarding their products to offshore companies. These
scenarios should be considered when defining the legislation.
3) Low User Acceptance: The security update labels could
fail as they might not have the expected effect on consumers’
buying decisions. Prior user studies [51]–[54] outline that
consumers tend to be reluctant towards the installation of
updates. This behavior results from a lack of clarity about
the usefulness of updates as well as from negative update
experiences in the past, such as unwanted changes in user
interfaces or in functionality. In consequence, the attitude
towards security updates is affected as users typically do not
differentiate between different types of updates. Therefore,
security update labels could have a low user acceptance.
Potential moral hazard [55] could also lead to a low user
acceptance. In our context, this means that users might not
be willing to pay a price premium to protect against security
vulnerabilities that will not affect them. An illustration are
the attacks by the Mirai botnet [7], in which thousands of
IoT consumer products deployed in Latin America attacked
US-based Internet services. In this case, why would a Latin-
American consumer pay a price premium for a security update
guarantee that protects US businesses?
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The concerns of ineffectiveness and potential misuse de-
pend on the legislation and business decisions of particular
manufacturers. We leave the investigation of these concerns
to future work. In the following, we investigate the concern
of low user acceptance by means of a user study.
IV. CONCEPT OF USER STUDY
If security update labels turn out to be important for
consumers’ buying decisions, this would create economic
incentives for manufacturers to guarantee the timely patching
of security vulnerabilities in their IoT products. Therefore, we
consider the following research questions:
RQ1 What is the relative importance of the availability pe-
riod and provisioning time for security updates for buying
decisions compared to other product attributes?
RQ2 Are there differences in the relative importance of the
availability period and provisioning time for security up-
dates between products with a high perceived security risk
compared to products with a low perceived security risk?
RQ3 Are there differences in the relative importance of the
availability and provisioning time for security updates ac-
cording to demographic characteristics of the consumers?
RQ4 Are there differences in the relative importance of the
availability and provisioning time for security updates de-
pending on security behavior intentions, privacy concerns,
and security risk perception of the consumers?
In the following, we investigate these research questions for
German consumers by means of a user study. Germany has the
largest consumer market within the EU, and the fourth largest
consumer market worldwide after USA, China, and Japan [56].
Structure of the User Study: We utilize conjoint analysis, as
this method is well suited for our objectives (cf. Section II-C):
We aim to determine the influence of the availability period
and provisioning time attributes on consumers’ choices. This
includes whether these attributes are desired at all (i.e., do con-
sumers care about the availability of security updates?), and
which attribute levels are more attractive (i.e., do consumers
favor short provisioning time or long availability periods?).
To answer the research questions, we needed to choose
product categories that differ in the perceived security risk. We
decided on two product categories as this number is sufficient
to answer the research questions: one with a high perceived
security risk as well as one with a low perceived security risk.
The user study followed a three-stage approach as shown in
Figure 1: In the first stage (Prestudy 1), two suitable product
categories were selected. In the second stage (Prestudy 2),
we determined the most important product attributes and their
levels for each of the two product categories. In the third stage
(Conjoint Analysis), we assessed the consumers’ preferences
(RQ1), comparing the attributes of the security update label
with other important product attributes. Finally, we validated
the preference model, compared the product categories (RQ2),
and performed a segmentation analysis (RQ3, RQ4).
Ethics and Recruitment: The study design was approved
by the data protection office of our university. All data was
Fig. 1: Structure of user study.
processed in accordance with the German data protection
laws and all survey answers were pseudonymized. The online
surveys were hosted on a web server that is provided by our
university, and secured such that only authorized entities have
access to the collected data. The respondents for the online
surveys were recruited at an online crowdworker platform, as
prior work showed that such samples are appropriate for secu-
rity research [57]. We used the Clickworker.de platform [58],
which claims to have the largest crowd of German-speaking
workers. For all online surveys, we selected the respondents
with following characteristics: all genders, age between 18 and
65, and Germany as country of residence. The crowdworkers
were paid according to the German minimum wage of e8.84
per hour.
Translation of Psychometric Scales: As we run our surveys
with German-speaking respondents, we translated all items of
utilized English psychometric scales. These scales measure,
e.g., privacy concerns [59] or security behavior intentions [60].
To ensure a reliable translation, we utilized a methodology
proposed by Venkatesh et al. [61]. Three bilingual domain
experts translated the English scales into German individually.
Then, the experts discussed differences in their translations and
agreed on a single final version. Finally, three other persons
(an English native speaker, a professional translator, and a
German who lived for several years in the UK) retranslated
the German scales back into the original language. Through
verifying that the original scales matched the retranslated
scales semantically, the translation was considered successful.
Statistical Data Analysis: We denote by µ the mean value,
and by σ the standard deviation. To assess the practical mean-
ing of the statistical results, we report effect sizes [62]: For
unpaired t-tests, the absolute value of d < 0.5 is considered
small, d between 0.5 and 0.8 medium, and d > 0.8 large effect.
For paired t-tests, effect size dz is interpreted identically to
d. Cramer’s V measures effect sizes for χ2 tests, and r for
ANOVA1. Values around 0.10 indicate a small, 0.30 a medium,
and 0.50 a large effect [63].
1r denotes effect size for one-way independent ANOVA according to
Field [63, p. 472] and is calculated as
√
η2.
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V. PRELIMINARY STUDIES
A. Prestudy 1: Selection of Product Categories
The objective of this prestudy is to identify two categories
of IoT products according to the following criteria:
C1 Both categories should differ significantly in their per-
ceived security risk.
C2 Both categories should be similar concerning other central
product attitudes and their purchase intentions: Attitude
towards product category (in terms of favor, likability,
pleasure) [64], involvement with product category (in terms
of, e.g., fascination, excitement) [65], consumption motive
(hedonistic or utilitarian) [66], desirability to possess prod-
ucts of this product category [67], and purchase intention
for products of this product category [68]. The items of
these scales are reported in Appendix A.
Perceived Security Risk Scale: To distinguish between prod-
uct categories with a high and low perceived security risk
(criterion C1), we needed a scale that measures the perceived
security risk associated with IoT consumer products. After an
extensive literature review, we concluded that there is no scale
that sufficiently fits our purpose. Declined candidates [59],
[69], [70] comprised scales that measure security and privacy
risks in e-commerce settings. However, because IoT products
may have adverse effects on the physical world, their security
risks are fundamentally different.
Thus, we developed a perceived security risk scale for IoT
consumer products using a similar methodology as proposed
by Davis [71]. In the first step, we defined the concept of
the perceived security risk in IoT products. Perceived risk is
defined as the customers’ perceptions of uncertainty and unfa-
vorable consequences concerning a product or a service [72].
In the context of security, uncertainty means the probability of
a security incident, while consequences are the loss caused by
such an incident. We decided to measure only consequences
with our scale. We think that it is very difficult for non-experts
to determine the probability of a security incident associated
with a particular IoT product category, because they would
need to assess the quality of the product’s security measures
as well as the attractiveness of the product for attackers. On
the other hand, the assessment of consequences of a security
incident requires knowledge about the deployment and utiliza-
tion of the product. Usage scenarios are known to consumers,
and therefore, they can imagine potential consequences. As
a result, we defined that perceived security risk for an IoT
product exists if security vulnerabilities in this product are
perceived to lead to negative consequences for the user.
We further considered classical risk categories for product
purchase by Jacoby and Kaplan [73], which have often been
used to measure perceived risk in marketing research [72],
[74]. Additionally, we adapt risk categories by Featherman
and Pavlou [69], who already adapted Jacoby and Kaplan’s
categories for e-commerce settings.
We split the perceived security risk in four risk categories:
‘general’2, ‘privacy’, ‘physical’, and ‘financial’. Jacoby and
Kaplan [73] and Featherman and Pavlou [69] present further
risk categories that we did not consider because they have
low relevance for the security risk of IoT products: ‘perfor-
mance’, ‘time’, ‘psychological’, and ‘social’. Although the
performance of IoT products can be affected in a security
incident, performance deficiencies that affect functionality in
a dangerous way are already covered by physical risk. The
risk of wasting time in case of a security incident exists
for all product categories alike. We excluded psychological
risk as its original definition relates to the consumer’s self-
image or self-concept regarding a product [73]3. Effects of IoT
products on consumers’ psychological state (e.g., perception
of surveillance, or privacy violations) are considered in our
scale by items in the risk categories ‘privacy’ and ‘general’.
Finally, we did not take social risk into account since privacy
risk already covers effects on the status in one’s social groups.
Item candidates were generated and iteratively improved
through expert reviews by 14 experts from the domains of
cybersecurity, psychology and marketing research. The final
scale is presented in Appendix, Table XI and consists of 13
items relating to risk categories ‘general’, ‘privacy’, ‘physical’,
and ‘financial’. For the statistical comparison of the product
categories, we averaged the scale to form a composite index.
Survey Structure and Data Collection: We selected eight
candidate product categories through an overview of popular
IoT consumer products on online shopping websites and expert
judgment: smart alarm systems, smart door locks, smart light
bulbs, smart home cameras, smart smoke detectors, smart
thermostats, smart vacuum robots, and smart weather stations.
In the surveys, the products were introduced in a random-
ized order. Each product category was introduced with an
exemplary product picture and a short text that explained the
products’ features and usage scenarios. We emphasized that
all these products connect to the Internet.
To determine the sample size for this prestudy, we per-
formed a power analysis [75] for paired t-tests. Assuming that
large effects indicate practical relevance (Cohen’s dz = 0.8),
and the desired power of 0.99, the power analysis determined
30 participants as sufficient.
We collected data with an online questionnaire using
LimeSurvey [76]. The questionnaire was pretested by six
experienced colleagues at our institutes. During the tests we
realized that the amount of data that we wanted to collect
would lead to a long and exhausting survey. Therefore, we
decided to split the survey into two smaller questionnaires that
should be answered by two independent groups of respondents.
One group answered the perceived security risk (C1) for all
eight product categories, while the other group evaluated the
scales of C2 for all eight product categories. Each group
consisted of 30 crowdworkers. Through test runs, we estimated
2Jacoby and Kaplan [73] denote this risk category as ‘overall’. We renamed
it to ‘general’ since ‘overall’ could be misunderstood as average score over
all risk categories.
3Definition of psychologocal risk [73]: “the chances that an unfamiliar
brand of [product] will not fit in well with your self-image or self-concept.”
6
the average time to answer the surveys to be 10 to 12 minutes.
We paid each crowdworker e1.80 for 12 minutes.
Results: Sixty respondents (23 female, 37 male) aged
between 19 and 62 years (µ = 38.5, σ = 10.7) answered the
surveys. We did not exclude any responses. The collected data
was analyzed using IBM SPSS [63]. The perceived security
risk scale (C1) showed good statistical properties, which are
not presented here for brevity. However, in Appendix B, we
present the statistical properties of the scale using the results of
the main study (Section VI). For all scales of C2, Cronbach’s
alpha, a measure that defines the inner consistency of a scale,
was above the recommended threshold of .700 (>.858) [63].
According to our criteria, we found three candidate pairs of
product categories that do not statistically significantly differ
from each other in the factors of C2, but differ statistically
significantly in the perceived security risk:
1) Smart home camera and smart weather station
(t(29) = 7.57, p < 0.001, dz = 1.383)
2) Smart smoke detector and smart thermostat
(t(29) = 2.09, p < 0.05, dz = 0.381)
3) Smart smoke detector and smart vacuum robot
(t(29) = 3.29, p < 0.01, dz = 0.600)
We decided on the first pair as these product categories
have the highest difference between their perceived security
risk scores. More analysis details can be found in Appendix,
Tables XII and IX.
B. Prestudy 2: Definition of Product Attributes and Levels
After two product categories were chosen, the next step was
to determine product attributes that will be used in the conjoint
analysis. The number of attributes should be reasonable such
that a respondent can process them cognitively [77]. Otherwise
respondents might tend to use shortcut heuristics that ignore
less important features [78]. We decided for 7 attributes
per product category. Two attributes were reserved for the
attributes of the security update label (availability period and
provisioning time). The remaining five attributes comprised
existing product attributes that depend on the product category.
We paid attention to avoid correlation between attributes,
which would lead to illogical profiles. In the literature on
conjoint analysis, the specification of attributes lacks a golden
standard [79] and is approached in various ways, such as focus
groups, surveys, or expert judgements.
Method: We conducted an online survey to identify the
most important attributes for each product category to use
in conjoint analysis. For this, attribute candidates were col-
lected from online shopping websites. We prepared an online
questionnaire on LimeSurvey that listed these 18 individual
attributes, which are given in Appendix, Table VIII. Respon-
dents rated the importance of these attributes for their buying
decision using the dual-questioning methodology by Alpert
[80], [81]. The respondents rated following two items on 7-
point Likert scales: “How important is each of these attributes
in your buying decision?” and “How much difference do you
feel, there is among products of the product category ‘[prod-
uct]’ in each of these attributes?”. Both scores were multiplied
TABLE I: Product categories with their respective attributes
and attribute levels.
Category Attribute Levels
Smart
home
camera
1 Price e100, e120, e140, e160
2 Resolution HD, Full-HD
3 Field of vision 110°, 130°, 150°
4 Frame rate 25fps, 30fps, 50fps
5 Zoom function yes, no
6 Availability of
security updates
none, until 12/2020 (2 years),
until 12/2024 (6 years)
7 Provisioning time
for sec. updates
none, within 10 days, within 30
days
Smart
weather
station
1 Price e100, e120, e140, e160
2 Battery lifetime 1 year, 2 years, 3 years
3 Precision ±0.2°C, ±0.3°C, ±0.5°C
4 Rain/wind sensor yes, no
5 Expandability to
multiple rooms
yes, no
6 Availability of
security updates
none, until 12/2020 (2 years),
until 12/2024 (6 years)
7 Provisioning time
for sec. updates
none, within 10 days, within 30
days
to get an overall score for each product attribute. The higher
the overall score, the more important is the attribute.
Data Collection: We recruited 30 crowdworkers for this
preliminary survey who were each paid e0.75 (reward equiv-
alent for 5 minutes). In the screening of the collected data,
we found that one participant clicked the middle option for
almost all attributes and was six times faster than the average
participant. This person was excluded from the evaluation [82].
Results: The final set of participants consisted of 29 respon-
dents (18 female, 11 male) in the age between 20 and 63 years
(µ = 35.3, σ = 11.5). The results are reported in Appendix,
Table VIII. In summary, the product attributes that are per-
ceived as most important for smart home cameras were price,
resolution, field of vision, frame rate, and zoom function. For
smart weather stations, the most important product attributes
were price, battery lifetime, precision, rain and wind sensor,
and expandability for multiple rooms. In Appendix, Table VIII,
we listed ‘solar panel for energy generation’ as second most
important product attribute for smart weather stations. How-
ever, in line with prior research [83], we refrained from this
attribute because it correlates with ‘battery lifetime’, and the
correlated attributes bear the risk of threatening the study’s
validity. We decided to include ‘battery lifetime’ as nearly
all smart weather stations use batteries, while solar panels are
only a rare feature in this product category. In addition to these
attributes, we added the availability and provisioning time of
security updates introduced in Section III-B. The final list of
attributes is shown in Table I.
Attribute Levels: For each attribute, a discrete number of
levels had to be specified. The number of attribute levels
should be as low as possible and does not need to cover
the full feature range of the attribute. As recommended [84],
we defined two to four levels to keep the complexity of the
conjoint analysis low. Similarly to the specification of the
attributes, there is no golden standard in defining the attribute
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levels. We decided to specify the levels with reasonable values
that we acquired through the examination of the most popular
products in both product categories available on Amazon as of
October 2018. Thereby, we took care to avoid the specification
of extreme values that are considered outliers.
We considered price levels in the realistic price ranges on
the market. We found smart home cameras by 13 manufac-
turers with prices between e50 and e179 (around e110 on
average), and smart weather stations by 10 manufacturers in
the range between e54 and e176 (around e129 on average).
To enhance the comparability, we defined the same price levels
for both product categories. Furthermore, we decided not to
use prices below e100 as the threshold between a two-figure
price and a three-figure price might bias the importance of the
price attribute considerably towards two-figure prices. Also,
we consistently used 0-ending prices [85], [86] and finally
chose four price levels with an equal spacing between e100
and e160. For all further product attributes, we chose two to
three levels that reflect the attribute span of products on the
market. All attribute levels are summarized in Table I.
Focus Group: As the attributes of the security update label
are unknown to consumers, we run a focus group to gain an
intuitive description of the security update label’s attributes
and their levels. The focus group consisted of 8 participants (5
females and 3 males) in the age between 19 and 54 years (µ =
33.5, σ = 12.9) without professional cybersecurity background.
Two participants had a professional IT background. Thus, we
paid attention that these two participants did not dominate
the discussion. We rewarded each participant with e10 for a
one hour session. We started the focus group by establishing
the participants’ prior experience with IoT consumer products,
their awareness of security problems in these products, as well
as their experience with security updates in general. Then, we
introduced the idea of the security update labels and asked
the participants to write down how they would explain the
attributes to family and friends. Each participant presented
their explanations and we discussed them with the group.
Based on the focus group discussion, we presented the avail-
ability period in the conjoint analysis survey as ‘availability of
security updates’ (German: ‘Verfu¨gbarkeit von Sicherheitsup-
dates’) with a fixed end date, e.g., ‘until 12/2020’, and with the
relative period of time until this date (e.g. ‘2 years’) to reduce
the cognitive effort for the respondents. Although the relative
period is not part of the proposed label, the reduction of
cognitive load was important as the respondents will compare
availability attributes in 10 choice tasks. The levels of the
availability attribute were chosen to reflect realistic conditions:
There is always a level of non-availability (i.e., manufacturer
does not guarantee security updates), a level similar to the
usual warranty period of this class of products (i.e., 2 years),
and a third level that exceeds the usual warranty period and is
more oriented on the realistic lifetime of the product (i.e., 6
years). The provisioning time attribute was defined to reflect
non-availability, a rather fast (and ideal) period of 10 days, and
a slower (and more realistic) period of 30 days. We denoted
the provisioning time attribute in the survey as ‘provision
time of security updates’ (German: ‘Bereitstellungszeit von
Sicherheitsupdates’).
To exclude confusing profiles that occur from certain
combinations of availability and provisioning time, e.g., the
manufacturer does not provide security updates but offers a
provisioning time of 30 days, we only allowed for meaningful
combinations of both attributes.
VI. CONJOINT ANALYSIS
We decided on a choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis as
this variant is the de-facto conjoint data collection standard in
marketing research [87] (cf. Section II-C). Although CBC’s
data collection is considered less efficient than other conjoint
data collection methods, it provides a better predictor of real-
world in-market behavior [88]. Furthermore, it allows a “no
choice”-option that also contributes valuable information, i.e.,
that all options are unattractive.
A. Method
We used Lighthouse Studio by Sawtooth Software [87] for
survey setup and data analysis. Lighthouse Studio is a well-
established and validated tool for conjoint analysis [89], [90].
To avoid fatigue, each respondent evaluated only one of
the two product categories, whereas the product category
was assigned randomly to the respondents. Upon starting
the survey, general information about the context, privacy of
collected data, and the scope of the survey were presented. The
respondents expected a survey about a smart home product.
Then, the particular product category was introduced with a
short explanation about its features and exemplary product
pictures. We asked if the respondent is familiar with this
product category and if she owns such a product.
In line with previous research [91], [92], we explained
all attributes shown in Table I (except price) with a short
description, to raise their comprehension and prevent misun-
derstandings. To validate the comprehension, the respondent
answered a quiz that included a question for each attribute. For
example, for the availability attribute, we asked “What does
the availability of security updates specify?” with possible
answers: (a) “for how long the manufacturer guarantees to
provide security updates”, (b) “for how long the device is
allowed to be used”, (c) “for how long the device guarantees
to be protected against hacker attacks”. While the first answer
was correct in this example, the order of possible answers
was randomly permuted in the questionnaire. If the respondent
chose a wrong answer, the correct answer was explained again.
Also, the quiz did not follow the order of how the attributes
were presented before to rule out learning effects.
After the respondent became familiar with the attributes,
the choice tasks for the conjoint analysis were explained: The
respondent is presented with four product profiles and has
to decide for the most attractive option. All product profiles
are described by an attribute level for each product attribute
(including the security update label attributes) in plain text.
In addition to the set of product alternatives, there is always
a “no choice”-option that can be chosen in case none of the
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four profiles is desirable. An exemplary choice task is depicted
in Appendix, Figure 2. Then, each respondent performed ten
choice tasks including eight randomly-generated tasks, which
were individual for each respondent, and two fixed holdout
tasks, which were identical for all. The fixed holdout tasks
were later used to validate the attribute preference model. This
model is based on the eight randomly generated tasks and
should be similar to the model based on the holdout tasks in
order to ensure internal consistency of the conjoint analysis
(Section VI-F). The respondents were not aware whether a
choice task is randomly generated or fixed. Prior research [93]
concluded that the order of the attributes affects the choice
behavior. Therefore, we randomly permuted the order of all 7
attributes for each respondent but kept the same order for a
particular respondent as it might be confusing otherwise.
After the respondents performed the choice tasks, we mea-
sured the perceived security risk for the particular product
category by facilitating the perceived security risk scale from
Section V-A. Finally, we used psychometric scales to measure
the respondents’ privacy concerns with the Internet [59] as
well as their security behavior intentions [60].
Next, we included control questions to assess whether the
respondents had difficulties in understanding the survey, had
been distracted, and if they took the choice tasks seriously.
These questions were used to identify unmotivated respon-
dents that we later excluded from the analysis. Finally, we
collected demographic data: gender, year of birth, vocational
qualification, professional IT background, and net income.
This data was used to determine the representativeness of
the sample as well as for the segmentation. To ensure that
the respondents stayed focused, we included a number of
motivational statements in the questionnaire.
B. Pilot Study
The questionnaire was developed in multiple iterative
rounds. After completing the final draft, we collected feed-
back from seven experts from academic and market research
institutes. We asked whether they understood the attributes
and tasks, and if anything could be misleading. Using their
feedback, we re-worded some instructions. Finally, we tested
the questionnaire with 60 crowdworkers to check that the ques-
tionnaire is working as expected, and to calculate the average
task completion time needed to determine the compensation.
C. Sample Size
The sample size, i.e., number of respondents for our
questionnaire, was chosen as a trade-off between increasing
costs and decreasing sampling errors. Sampling error arises if
the samples of respondents do not represent the population.
Practical guidelines [94] on CBC analyses recommend at
least 300 respondents for studies without segmentation. If a
segmentation analysis is desired, as is the case with our study,
then a minimum of 200 respondents per subgroup is advised.
Since we aimed for a comparison of up to three subgroups,
which is a usual configuration in a segmentation analysis, we
TABLE II: Demographic data of conjoint analysis sample
compared with the German population.
Sample Population
All 1,466
Gender
female 640 44.0% 49.8%a
male 805 55.3% 50.2%a
3rd option 10 0.7%
Age (in years)
18-24 339 23.1% 12.9%a
25-29 288 19.6% 9.6%a
30-49 432 29.5% 18.8%a
50-64 404 27.5% 58.7%a
Vocational
qualification
none 156 10.6% 22.8%a
vocational 582 39.7% 60.2%a
academic 728 49.7% 17.0%a
Monthly net
income (in e)
none 52 4.3% 17.9%b
less than 900 288 23.5% 24.3%b
900 to 1,500 296 24.2% 22.7%b
1,500 to 2,600 377 30.8% 22.4%b
more than 2,600 210 17.2% 10.2%b
Professional
IT background
yes 249 17.6%
no 1166 82.4%
aCensus 2011 (age 18-65) [95], bMikrozensus 2014 (all ages) [96]
Missing answers are ignored for percent proportioning.
decided to recruit around 800 respondents for each product
category, and thus, 1,600 respondents in total.
In the pilot study, the average time to answer the question-
naire was 8 minutes. Thus, we paid crowdworkers e1.20. We
ensured that respondents of the prestudies could not participate
in the main survey.
D. Sample Characteristics
We collected the data within a week in mid-December
2018. After a screening, we excluded 154 (9.5%) of the
1,620 collected data sets. We excluded 70 data sets due to
low task completion times (within less than half of the pilot
study’s average time), 48 data sets due to indications in
the control questions, 19 data sets due to suspected multi-
participation (same IP address and user agent), 16 data sets
that answered more than two quiz questions wrong, and 3
data sets of respondents under 18 years. The final sample
included 1466 data sets (640 female, 805 male) in the age
between 18 and 65 years (µ = 33.8, σ = 11.2). Details of the
demographic data are presented in Table II. In comparison to
the German population, the sample is biased towards males
and high-educated persons. Furthermore, people in the age of
50 and above are underrepresented in this sample. However,
the sample aligns to the target group of consumers interested
in IoT consumer products, which is likewise biased towards
males, age group 25-34, and higher incomes [97].
E. Results
In total, 731 respondents evaluated the product category
‘smart home camera’ and 735 respondents assessed the prod-
uct category ‘smart weather station’. The high difference in
the security risk perception between both product categories
was confirmed: While the smart weather station achieved an
average perceived security risk score of 3.65, the smart home
camera achieved an average score of 5.50. This difference
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TABLE III: Relative importance of product attributes.
Smart Home Camera (n=731) Smart Weather Station (n=735)
Rank Attribute µ [%] σ [%] Attribute µ [%] σ [%]
1. Availability1 30.57 9.82 Availability1 20.37 9.28
2. Price 15.12 8.86 Price 16.64 11.03
3. Provisioning time2 13.98 6.30 Rain/wind sensor 16.37 9.87
4. Resolution 12.05 8.98 Provisioning time2 16.12 7.96
5. Frame rate 10.71 6.06 Expandability 13.15 8.14
6. Field of view 8.89 5.29 Battery lifetime 9.82 6.53
7. Zoom function 8.68 6.72 Precision 7.53 4.84
1Availability of security updates, 2Provisioning time for security updates
TABLE IV: Average utilities of selected product attributes.
Attribute Level Smart HomeCamera
Smart Weather
Station
Price
100e 33.64 44.13
120e 19.46 21.08
140e -5.66 -9.33
160e -47.45 -55.88
Availability of
sec. updates
none -111.93 -77.52
until 12/2020 (2 years) 14.32 21.91
until 12/2024 (6 years) 97.61 55.61
Prov. time for
sec. updates
none -32.82 -61.10
within 10 days 37.16 43.75
within 30 days -4.34 17.35
Utilities of all levels of a certain product attribute add up to zero.
is highly statistically significant with the large effect size:
t(1464) = 28.42, p < 0.001, d = 1.48. Cronbach’s alpha for
all psychometric scales was above the recommended threshold
of .700 (>.837) [63].
For the analysis of the collected conjoint data from the
randomly-generated choice tasks, we used hierarchical Bayes
estimation with default settings as recommended [87]. Using
this estimation method, we determined the average relative
importance of each product attribute as well as the part-
worth utility for each product level based on a total of 5,848
(home camera) and 5,880 (weather station) choice tasks. The
relative importance of an attribute defines the relative impact
(measured in percent) on the overall choice. The importances
are ratio data meaning that an attribute with an importance
of 20% is twice as much important as an attribute with an
importance of 10% [98].
As listed in Table III, the availability of security updates
(31%) is the most important attribute for smart home cameras.
It is twice as important as price (15%) and provisioning time
for security updates (14%). Other functional attributes are less
important with relative importance between 8% and 12%. For
the smart weather stations, the availability of security updates
(20%) is also the most important attribute. However, the
difference in importance to other product attributes is smaller
than for the smart home cameras. The relative importance of
price, rain and wind sensor, and provisioning time for security
updates are at around 16%. All other attributes are ranked with
relative importances between 7% and 13%.
In general, the relative importance of the attributes differ
between both product categories. Good research practice,
e.g., [86], strongly discourages quantitative comparison of
preference measurements of different product categories to
each other, as the importance of an attribute can only be
interpreted as relative value within the particular product
category. Therefore, we discuss the possible differences qual-
itatively. For the product with the high perceived security
risk, especially the availability of security updates (twice as
important as other attributes) seems to play a more crucial
role in buying decisions than for the product with the low
perceived security risk (only slightly more important than other
attributes). Furthermore, the provisioning time for security
updates is considered the third most important attribute for the
product with the high perceived security risk and the fourth
most important attribute for the product with the low perceived
security risk. Thus, the provisioning time for security updates
seems to have a similar importance than price and other
highly-ranked technical attributes.
To summarize, the availability of security updates plays the
most important role in the consumers’ choice in this study.
The relative importance of the provisioning time for security
updates is also high, although substantially lower than of the
availability of security updates. For both product categories,
the second most important attribute is the price. Functional
features of both product categories are rated as less important
than the attributes of the security update label and price, except
the rain and wind sensor for smart weather stations.
Table IV shows the average utilities that consumers ascribe
to the levels of product attributes [98]. Negative utilities repre-
sent unfavorable options compared to the other options, while
positive utilities describe the favorable options. The utilities
of all levels of a certain product attribute add up to zero.
For the price attribute, lower prices have a higher utility for
consumers. For both product categories, the non-availability of
security updates is considered as especially unfavorable with
the highest negative utility scores among all attributes. The
availability of security updates for 6 years is more favorable
than for 2 years. The utility for the provisioning time for
security updates shows a preference for short time period
(10 days) rather than a longer time period (30 days). A
provisioning time of 30 days has a negative utility for the
smart home camera, in contrast to the smart weather station.
Thus, participants dislike long provisioning times for a product
with high perceived security risk.
F. Validity
We tested the internal consistency of our results by compar-
ing simulations based on the preference measurement results
with choice data from holdout tasks (cf. Section VI-A).
Furthermore, we validated the preference for long availability
periods and short provisioning times. The results of the holdout
tasks were not included into the calculation of the preference
measurement results.
For the holdout tasks, we defined five product profiles – P1,
P2, P3a, P3b, P4 – for each product category. Profiles P3a and
P3b differ only in their security update label attributes: In P3a,
there was no guarantee for the availability and provisioning
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TABLE V: Comparing the market estimation regarding shares
of preferences of four pre-defined product configurations with
real preferences in fixed holdout tasks.
Smart Home Camera Smart Weather Station
Holdout Task 1 Holdout Task 2 Holdout Task 1 Holdout Task 2
P1, P2, P3a, P4 P4, P3b, P2, P1 P1, P2, P3a, P4 P4, P3b, P2, P1
Pr
od
uc
t
Pr
ofi
le
Estimated Real Estimated Real Estimated Real Estimated Real
P1 1.5% 2.7% 1.4% 2.9% 1.7% 3.3% 1.5% 2.7%
P2 4.8% 11.4% 2.4% 5.7% 22.1% 21.0% 15.8% 16.5%
P3 3.6% 6.6% 58.8% 53.4% 5.3% 9.5% 36.5% 32.7%
P4 84.4% 72.8% 34.6% 35.6% 61.1% 57.1% 39.0% 42.0%
None 5.7% 6.6% 2.8% 2.5% 9.7% 9.1% 7.1% 6.1%
P3a and P3b differ only in the security update label attributes: P3a does not
guarantee security updates, whereas P3b guarantees availability of security
updates until 2024 (6 years) and a provisioning time within 10 days.
time of security updates. In P3b, these two attributes were set
to the objectively best levels: availability of security updates
for 6 years with provisioning time of 10 days.
In the course of the survey, each respondent performed 10
choice tasks, of which 8 were randomly-generated tasks and
2 were fixed holdout tasks. The fixed holdout tasks were the
same for all respondents of a product category and appeared
as the 4th and 8th of the 10 choice tasks. Both holdout task
consisted of the four product profiles that were presented in
a different fixed order. In the first holdout task (i.e., the 4th
choice task), the profiles (P1, P2, P3a, P4) were presented. In
the second holdout task (i.e., the 8th choice task), the profiles
(P4, P3b, P2, P1) were presented.
The results in Table V (‘Real’-columns) for smart home
cameras show that in the first holdout task 6.6% decided for
P3a without guarantee for security updates, while in the second
holdout task 53.4% chose P3b with best guarantee for security
updates. The same effect can be observed for the smart weather
station: in the first choice task, 9.5% choose P3a, while 32.7%
decided for P3b. This validates the results that we derived from
the randomly-generated choice tasks: The (non-)availability of
security updates is an important factor in buying decisions,
while this effect seems to be higher for products with high
perceived security risk.
We tested the consistency of the hierarchical Bayes esti-
mation with the market simulator from Lighthouse Studio,
which represents a standard procedure to assess the internal
validity of CBC models [89]. This market simulator estimates
the shares of preferences for the product profiles P1 to P4
based on the preference measurement results of the conjoint
analysis. We compared the estimated market shares with the
evidence gathered through the holdout tasks (see Table V).
For example, in the first holdout task of the smart home
camera, the market simulator estimated a market share of
84.4% for P4, while the evaluation of the real choices showed
that 72.8% of the respondents decided for P4. Based on the
comparison of estimated and real choices, we conclude that
although the simulator does not exactly match the real choices,
the preference measurement results are robust in estimating
the order and magnitude of the overall preferences, which
indicates a high consistency of the results.
G. Segmentation
We used the latent class segmentation module of Lighthouse
Studio to assign respondents to groups that have similar
preferences. The module implements latent class analysis, a
classification technique to find groups in multi-dimensional
data. First, we needed a measure to decide in how many
reasonable segments we split the respondents. Following rec-
ommendations of Sawtooth Software [100], we used the con-
sistent Akaike’s information criterion [101] as measure. Based
on this criterion (see Appendix C), we decided to split the
respondents of the product categories “smart home camera”
and “smart weather station” into two and three segments,
respectively. The consumer segmentation for both product
categories is shown in Table VI. The differences in preferences
between the segments are given in Table VII.
For the smart home camera, both segments differ statisti-
cally significantly only in the perceived security risk. For the
first group with lower security risk perception towards smart
home cameras, the availability of security updates (31%) is
the most important product attribute and twice as important as
resolution (16%) and price (12%). In comparison to the impor-
tance of technical features (9–11%) other than the resolution,
the availability of security updates is even three times more
important. For the second group with the higher security risk
perception, the availability (25%) and provisioning time (19%)
of security updates are the most important product attributes
followed by price (17%). Compared to the importance of the
technical features (9–12%), availability and provisioning time
are (almost) twice as important.
For the smart weather station, the segments differ statisti-
cally significantly with regard to age, vocational qualification,
income, privacy concerns, security behavior intentions, and
perceived security risk. The first group exhibits the highest
average age, high vocational qualifications, the highest income,
high privacy concerns, the highest security behavior intentions,
as well as a high security risk perception towards smart
weather stations. For this group, the availability of security
updates (23%) as well as the rain and wind sensor (23%) are
the most important product attributes, followed by provision-
ing time (20%) and expandability (16%). These attributes are
2 to 3 times as important as the price (8%).
The second group is characterized by lower vocational
qualification, the highest privacy concerns, and the highest
perceived security risk. For this group, the attributes of the
security update label dominate the choice decision and account
for 60% of the overall importance. The availability (35%) and
provisioning time (25%) is three and two times as important,
respectively, than technical features. For this group, the price
(6%) is the least important attribute for their choice.
The third group perceives the lowest risk for smart weather
stations. This group is the youngest on average, has the lowest
income, as well as the lowest privacy concerns and security
behavior intentions. The most important product attribute is the
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TABLE VI: Consumer segmentation via latent-class analysis.
Smart Home Camera Smart Weather Station
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Total number of respondents n1 488 243 Group 1 vs Group 2 182 221 332 Group 1 vs Group 2 vs Group 32
Gender female 42.6% 44.9% χ2(1) = 0.42, V = 0.024 43.4% 50.2% 40.1% χ2(2) = 4.40, V = 0.08male 55.9% 53.1% 53.8% 49.8% 58.7%
Age µ [years] 33.0 33.9 t(729) = −1.10, d = −0.09 36.9 34.8 32.8 F (2, 732) = 8.00**, r = 0.15
Vocational
qualification
none 9.2% 11.9% 8.2% 11.8% 12.3%
vocational 38.7% 42.8% χ2(2) = 3.35, V = 0.068 37.9% 43.0% 37.7% χ2(4) = 68.31**, V = 0.22
academic 52.0% 45.3% 53.8% 45.2% 50.0%
Monthly net income3 µ [e] 1704 1706 t(599) = −0.22, d = 0.002 1854 1707 1532 F (2, 619) = 3.73*, r = 0.11
Professional
IT background
yes 18.5% 17.7%
χ2(1) = 0.06, V = 0.01
13.7% 17.2% 17.8%
χ2(2) = 0.37, V = 0.02no 81.5% 82.3% 81.3% 81.4% 80.4%
Privacy concerns 4.48 4.59 t(729) = −0.98, d = −0.08 4.54 4.57 4.26 F (2, 732) = 3.86*, r = 0.10
Security behavior intention 3.59 3.56 t(729) = 0.59, d = 0.05 3.70 3.67 3.47 F (2, 732) = 16.74**, r = 0.17
Perceived security risk 5.44 5.61 t(729) = −2.13*, d = −0.17 3.88 3.96 3.32 F (2, 732) = 10.31**, r = 0.21
Notation: Statistically significant with *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, 1If missing values appear for specific variables, respective analyses rely on a diverging number
of cases. 2Post-hoc tests are given in Appendix, Table X. 3Income data were processed following the methodology of the German sample census [99].
TABLE VII: Product attribute importance of consumer groups.
Smart Home Camera Smart Weather Station
Rank Group 1 (n = 488) Group 2 (n = 243) Group 1 (n = 182) Group 2 (n = 221) Group 3 (n = 332)
1. Availability1 31.42% Availability1 25.26% Availability1 23.41% Availability1 35.24% Price 29.98%
2. Resolution 16.47% Provisioning time2 19.03% Rain/wind sensor 23.14% Provisioning time2 24.62% Rain/wind sensor 20.55%
3. Price 11.82% Price 16.66% Provisioning time2 19.38% Expandability 12.95% Battery Lifetime 13.46%
4. Frame rate 10.68% Field of view 11.64% Expandability 15.90% Battery Lifetime 8.12% Expandability 12.88%
5. Zoom function 10.48% Frame rate 9.26% Price 8.49% Rain/wind sensor 7.11% Precision 8.49%
6. Provisioning time2 10.22% Resolution 9.17% Battery Lifetime 5.26% Precision 6.19% Availability1 8.01%
7. Field of view 8.91% Zoom function 8.98% Precision 4.44% Price 5.76% Provisioning time2 6.64%
1Availability of security updates, 2Provisioning time for security updates
price (30%), followed by technical features, such as rain and
wind sensor (21%) and battery lifetime (13%). The availability
(8%) and provisioning time (7%) are the least important
attributes, i.e., the security update label plays only a minor
role in the consumers’ choice of this segment.
VII. DISCUSSION
We discuss research questions formulated in Section IV, and
consider economic and policy implications of our results.
RQ1: Relative importance of the availability period and
provisioning time. The availability of security updates was the
product attribute with the highest relative importance (up to
twice as important as other high-ranked attributes) as well as
with the widest span of average utility (Table III). Provisioning
time for security updates was evaluated as less important than
their availability, but seems to be more important than most
technical features. Consumers also prefer short provisioning
times, and even assign a negative utility (i.e., dislike) to the
provisioning time of 30 days for the product with the high
perceived security risk (Table IV). The high importance of the
attributes of the security update label is surprising, as users
are not familiar with these attributes. This might be due to the
explicit mentioning of the non-availability of security updates
that might have discouraged the users. This effect can be seen
in Table IV where the negative utility of non-availability is
greater (-111.93 for home cameras and -77.52 for weather
stations) than the positive utility of availability of security
updates for 6 years (97.61 and 55.61, respectively). This
indicates that consumers want to avoid the non-availability of
security updates, and therefore, the mandatory nature of the
security update label is very important.
RQ2: Differences between products with a low and high
perceived security risk. We observed differences in the relative
importance of the security update attributes. For the product
with the high perceived security risk, the importance of
availability is at least twice as high as the importance of other
attributes. In contrast, availability is only slightly more impor-
tant than for other high-ranked attributes for the product with a
low perceived security risk. Furthermore, for the product with
the high perceived security risk, the results of the holdout tasks
(cf. Table V, ‘Real’-columns) show an increase of preference
for product profile P3a from 6.6% (without guaranteed security
update) to 53.4% for profile P3b (with 6-year guarantee for
security updates). For the product with the low perceived
security risk, there is a comparatively smaller increase from
9.5% to 32.7% in the preference for the analogous product
profiles. Also, if we sum up the importance of both label
attributes, the security update label shows a relative importance
of 45% for the consumers’ choice regarding the product with
the high perceived security risk, compared to 36% for the
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product with the low perceived security risk.
This finding supports the concern of moral hazard (Sec-
tion III-D): Users might consider security update labels pri-
marily if they think that they could be personally affected by
security incidents. In reality, however, products with seemingly
low perceived security risk for the owner can be used for
serious attacks. For example, Mirai utilized digital video
recorders [7]. We conclude that the introduction of security
update labels might need educational campaigns that explain
non-personal security risks associated with IoT devices.
RQ3: Differences due to demographic characteristics of the
consumers. The sample segmentation for the product with
high perceived security risk did not show any differences in
demographic factors (Table VI). For the product with low
perceived security risk, the segmentation showed statistically
significant differences in terms of age, vocational qualification,
and income. The groups with higher age and higher income
assigned a higher importance to the security update label
attributes (Table VII). This could indicate that this type of
consumers may invest more in sustainable security of their
IoT devices. In contrast, the group with the youngest age
and lowest income seems not to care much about security
updates. We conclude that for products with a high perceived
security risk, demographics may play a minor role, whereas
for the products with lower perceived security risk, younger
population with lower income may prefer cheaper products
with lower security.
RQ4: Differences due to security behavior intentions, pri-
vacy concerns, and security risk perception of the consumers.
While the segmentation of the product category with the high
perceived security risk showed only minor differences between
the groups, the groups for the product category with the low
perceived security risk range from very low to very high
importance of the security update label. There, the respondents
with higher security behavior intentions and privacy concerns
exhibit a higher preference for the attributes of the security
update label. For both product categories, a higher security risk
perception positively relates to the higher importance of the
security update label’s attributes. This indicates that consumers
with a higher sensitivity for security risks and privacy concerns
may assign a higher importance to the security update labels.
Limitations and Future Work: The results of the user study
have the usual limitations of conjoint analysis studies. For the
comparison of products, we had to limit the number of product
attributes and discretize attribute levels. Also, some product
attributes, such as product design, were discarded due to im-
practicality of the specification of attribute levels. Although we
specified product attributes and attribute levels based on best
practices and empirical evidence, a product profile cannot fully
represent all factors that may influence buying decisions, such
as product presentation, packaging, advertisement campaigns,
and consumer ratings. Usability aspects of update mechanisms
might also influence the consumers’ choice. Another limitation
might be due to the evaluation of stated preferences (i.e.,
hypothetical buying decisions). However, the assessment of
real buying decisions was infeasible as there are no suitable
products that guarantee security updates. Finally, as we ran
the user study with German respondents, the results might
not be valid for other markets. Thus, future work is required
to investigate the impact of security update labels in other
countries, and with different sets of participants, products,
and attributes. As we focused on the consumers’ choice in
this work, future work should also consider the positions of
manufacturers and policy makers.
Economic Implications: Security update guarantees may
create additional costs for the manufacturers that will be poten-
tially passed on to the consumers [29]. Are consumers willing
to bear these costs? CBC analyses are not appropriate to
precisely estimate consumers’ willingness to pay for a certain
attribute. However, attribute levels with a high importance for
consumers’ choices also indicate a willingness to pay a higher
price for products with this attribute level [90]. In addition,
initial support for the willingness to pay a price premium
is provided by studies that show that consumers perceive
price increases as fair if they are caused by higher costs
for a manufacturer [102]–[104]. Prior works [6], [105] also
concluded that consumers accept additional costs for security
depending on the product’s perceived security risk.
Policy Implications: Our results show that mandatory se-
curity update labels could indeed have a high influence on
the consumers’ choices. The labels communicate attributes
that enable non-experts to compare security properties of
different IoT products intuitively during the purchase process,
and thereby influence buying decisions. The introduction of
security update labels might increase security of IoT con-
sumer products through establishing economic incentives for
manufacturers to guarantee a long and timely availability
of security updates, or, from another perspective, creating
competitive disadvantages for the non-availability of security
updates. These labels could strengthen the state of IoT security
in the long term, as unpatched IoT consumer products are a
major reason behind today’s IoT security incidents.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security update labels benefit consumers, as they decrease
the probability of becoming a victim to disclosed but un-
patched vulnerabilities. They have the potential to motivate
manufacturers to invest more resources in the provision of
security updates, which might lead to positive security-related
changes in their business strategies. Finally, national security
will also profit from these labels, as they strengthen the
security of the private IoT infrastructure, and therefore, reduce
the attack surface for malicious domestic and foreign actors.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Freya Gassmann and Andrea Schankin for con-
sulting regarding the statistical evaluation of the user study.
We further thank the anonymous reviewers for their thorough
and valuable comments, as well as the shepherd of this paper,
Nick Feamster, for his guidance. This work was supported by
a software grant from Sawtooth Software.
13
REFERENCES
[1] K. Ashton, “That ‘internet of things’ thing,” RFiD Journal, vol. 22,
no. 7, pp. 97–114, 2009.
[2] Gartner, “Gartner says 8.4 billion connected ”things” will be in use in
2017, up 31 percent from 2016,” February 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917
[3] E. Zeng, S. Mare, and F. Roesner, “End user security and privacy
concerns with smart homes,” in 13th Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security, SOUPS, 2017, pp. 65–80.
[4] McAfee, “New security priorities in an increasingly connected world,”
January 2018.
[5] W. He, M. Golla, R. Padhi, J. Ofek, M. Du¨rmuth, E. Fernandes, and
B. Ur, “Rethinking access control and authentication for the home
internet of things (IoT),” in 27th USENIX Security Symposium, 2018.
[6] P. Emami-Naeini, H. Dixon, Y. Agarwal, and L. F. Cranor, “Exploring
how privacy and security factor into IoT device purchase behavior,”
in Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, CHI 2019, Glasgow, Scotland, UK, 2019.
[7] M. Antonakakis, T. April, M. Bailey, M. Bernhard, E. Bursztein,
J. Cochran, Z. Durumeric, J. A. Halderman, L. Invernizzi, M. Kallitsis,
D. Kumar, C. Lever, Z. Ma, J. Mason, D. Menscher, C. Seaman,
N. Sullivan, K. Thomas, and Y. Zhou, “Understanding the Mirai
botnet,” in 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2017, pp. 1093–1110.
[8] B. Schneier, “Testimony of Bruce Schneier [...] before the U.S. House
of Representatives [...] joint hearing entitled ‘Understanding the role
of connected devices in recent cyber attacks’,” November 2016.
[9] M. R. Warner, “S.1691 - Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity
Improvement Act of 2017,” August 2017.
[10] California Legislative Information, “SB-327 Information privacy: Con-
nected devices,” September 2018.
[11] European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA), “Baseline security recommendations for IoT,” October 2017.
[12] Centre for European Policy Studies, “Software vulnerability disclosure
in Europe – Technology, policies and legal challenges,” June 2018.
[13] R. Anderson, “Why information security is hard – An economic per-
spective,” in 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC 2001), 2001.
[14] R. Anderson and T. Moore, “The economics of information security,”
Science, vol. 314, no. 5799, pp. 610–613, 2006.
[15] P. Morgner and Z. Benenson, “Exploring security economics in IoT
standardization efforts,” in Proceedings of the NDSS Workshop on
Decentralized IoT Security and Standards, DISS’18, 2018.
[16] G. A. Akerlof, “The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the
market mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84,
no. 3, pp. 488–500, 1970.
[17] P. E. Green, A. M. Krieger, and Y. Wind, “Thirty years of conjoint
analysis: Reflections and prospects,” Interfaces, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 56–
73, 2001.
[18] D. R. Wittink, M. Vriens, and W. Burhenne, “Commercial use of con-
joint analysis in Europe: Results and critical reflections,” International
Journal of Research in Marketing, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 41–52, 1994.
[19] S. M. Handmaker, “Good counsel: Using conjoint analysis to calculate
damages,” Trial, June 2018.
[20] Library of Congress, “H.R.6 - Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007,” 2007.
[21] European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
“Directive 2010/30/EU,” May 2010. [Online]. Available: http:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32010L0030
[22] J. Winward, P. Schiellerup, and B. Boardman, Cool labels: The first
three years of the European energy label. Energy and Environment
Programme, Environmental Change Unit, Univ. of Oxford, 1998.
[23] P. Waide, “Monitoring of energy efficiency trends of refrigerators,
freezers, washing machines and washer-driers sold in the EU,” PW
Consulting for ADEME on behalf of the European Commission (SAVE).
PW Consulting: Manchester, 2001.
[24] K. Sammer and R. Wu¨stenhagen, “The influence of eco-labelling on
consumer behaviour – results of a discrete choice analysis for washing
machines,” Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 15, no. 3, pp.
185–199, 2006.
[25] Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, Construction
and Nuclear Safety (Germany), “Lifespan label for electrical products
– Study on the effect of lifespan information for electrical products on
the purchasing decision,” July 2017.
[26] P. G. Kelley, J. Bresee, L. F. Cranor, and R. W. Reeder, “A ‘nutrition
label’ for privacy,” in Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, SOUPS, 2009.
[27] P. G. Kelley, L. Cesca, J. Bresee, and L. F. Cranor, “Standardizing
privacy notices: An online study of the nutrition label approach,” in
Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, CHI 2010, 2010, pp. 1573–1582.
[28] J. Y. Tsai, S. Egelman, L. F. Cranor, and A. Acquisti, “The effect of
online privacy information on purchasing behavior: An experimental
study,” Information Systems Research, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 254–268,
2011.
[29] T. Chattopadhyay, N. Feamster, M. V. X. Ferreira, D. Y. Huang, and
S. M. Weinberg, “Selling a single item with negative externalities,” in
The World Wide Web Conference (WWW’19). New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2019, pp. 196–206.
[30] T. J. Gilbride, P. J. Lenk, and J. D. Brazell, “Market share constraints
and the loss function in choice-based conjoint analysis,” Marketing
Science, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 995–1011, 2008.
[31] B. Orme, “Which conjoint method should I use,” Sawtooth Software
Research Paper Series, 2014.
[32] S. Voleti, V. Srinivasan, and P. Ghosh, “An approach to improve
the predictive power of choice-based conjoint analysis,” International
Journal of Research in Marketing, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 325 – 335, 2017.
[33] M. Ryan and J. Hughes, “Using conjoint analysis to assess women’s
preferences for miscarriage management,” Health Economics, vol. 6,
no. 3, pp. 261–273, 1997.
[34] Sawtooth Software, Inc., “The Apple vs. Samsung ‘Patent trial of the
century,’ Conjoint analysis, and Sawtooth Software,” 2012.
[35] P. de Pelsmacker, L. Driesen, and G. Rayp, “Do consumers care
about ethics? Willingness to pay for fair-trade coffee,” The Journal
of Consumer Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 363–385, 2005.
[36] A. Drewnowski, H. Moskowitz, M. Reisner, and B. Krieger, “Testing
consumer perception of nutrient content claims using conjoint analy-
sis,” Public Health Nutrition, vol. 13, no. 5, p. 688–694, 2010.
[37] S. Hieke and P. Wilczynski, “Colour me in – an empirical study on
consumer responses to the traffic light signposting system in nutrition
labelling,” Public Health Nutrition, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 773–782, 2012.
[38] K. Sammer and R. Wu¨stenhagen, “The influence of eco-labelling on
consumer behaviour–results of a discrete choice analysis for washing
machines,” Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 15, no. 3, pp.
185–199, 2006.
[39] S. J. Murdoch, M. Bond, and R. Anderson, “How certification systems
fail: Lessons from the Ware report,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 10,
no. 6, pp. 40–44, 2012.
[40] E´. Leverett, R. Clayton, and R. Anderson, “Standardisation and certi-
fication of the ‘Internet of Things’,” 2017, 16th Annual Workshop on
the Economics of Information Security, WEIS 2017.
[41] W. Boyer and M. McQueen, “Ideal based cyber security technical
metrics for control systems,” in Critical Information Infrastructures
Security. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 246–260.
[42] Y. Lai and P. Hsia, “Using the vulnerability information of computer
systems to improve the network security,” Computer Communications,
vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 2032–2047, 2007.
[43] P. Mell, K. Scarfone, and S. Romanosky, “A complete guide to the
common vulnerability scoring system version 2.0 (2007),” 2007.
[44] D. J. Leversage and E. J. Byres, “Estimating a system’s mean time-to-
compromise,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 52–60, 2008.
[45] O. H. Alhazmi, Y. K. Malaiya, and I. Ray, “Measuring, analyzing and
predicting security vulnerabilities in software systems,” Computers &
Security, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 219–228, 2007.
[46] C. Jones and O. Bonsignour, The Economics of Software Quality.
Pearson Education, 2011.
[47] Federal Trade Commission, “Energy and water use labeling for
consumer products under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(“Energy Labeling Rule”),” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.
ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/
energy-water-use-labeling-consumer
[48] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 29147:2014
– Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability disclo-
sure,” February 2014.
[49] ——, “ISO/IEC 30111:2013 – Information technology – Security
techniques – Vulnerability handling processes,” November 2013.
[50] European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, “Regu-
lation (EU) 2016/679,” April 2016.
14
[51] K. Vaniea, E. J. Rader, and R. Wash, “Betrayed by updates: How
negative experiences affect future security,” in CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI’14, 2014, pp. 2671–2674.
[52] K. Vaniea and Y. Rashidi, “Tales of software updates: The process of
updating software,” in Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2016, pp. 3215–3226.
[53] A. Forget, S. Pearman, J. Thomas, A. Acquisti, N. Christin, L. F.
Cranor, S. Egelman, M. Harbach, and R. Telang, “Do or do not, there
is no try: User engagement may not improve security outcomes,” in
12th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS, 2016.
[54] A. Mathur and M. Chetty, “Impact of user characteristics on attitudes
towards automatic mobile application updates,” in 13th Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS, 2017, pp. 175–193.
[55] M. V. Pauly, “The economics of moral hazard: Comment,” The Amer-
ican Economic Review, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 531–537, 1968.
[56] World Bank, “Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure,”
2016. [Online]. Available: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.
CON.PRVT.CD
[57] E. M. Redmiles, S. Kross, and M. L. Mazurek, “How well do my
results generalize? Comparing security and privacy survey results from
MTurk, web, and telephone samples,” in 2019 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), 2019, pp. 227–244.
[58] Clickworker, “Data management services: AI training data, text
creation, web researches,” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.
clickworker.com/
[59] T. Dinev and P. Hart, “An extended privacy calculus model for e-
commerce transactions,” Information Systems Research, vol. 17, no. 1,
pp. 61–80, 2006.
[60] Y. Sawaya, M. Sharif, N. Christin, A. Kubota, A. Nakarai, and
A. Yamada, “Self-confidence trumps knowledge: A cross-cultural study
of security behavior,” in Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2017, pp. 2202–2214.
[61] V. Venkatesh, J. Y. L. Thong, and X. Xu, “Consumer acceptance
and use of information technology: Extending the unified theory of
acceptance and use of technology,” MIS Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, pp.
157–178, 2012.
[62] J. Cohen, Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988.
[63] A. Field, Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics. Sage
Publications, 2013.
[64] I. M. Martin, D. W. Stewart, and S. Matta, “Branding strategies, mar-
keting communication, and perceived brand meaning: The transfer of
purposive, goal–oriented brand meaning to brand extensions,” Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 275–294,
2005.
[65] C. Mathwick and E. Rigdon, “Play, flow, and the online search
experience,” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 324–
332, 2004.
[66] K. L. Wakefield and J. Inman, “Situational price sensitivity: The
role of consumption occasion, social context and income,” Journal of
Retailing, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 199–212, 2003.
[67] J. Lei, N. Dawar, and Z. Gu¨rhan-Canli, “Base-rate information in
consumer attributions of product-harm crises,” Journal of Marketing
Research, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 336–348, 2012.
[68] S. B. MacKenzie, R. J. Lutz, and G. E. Belch, “The role of attitude
toward the ad as a mediator of advertising effectiveness: A test of
competing explanations,” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 23, no. 2,
pp. 130–143, 1986.
[69] M. Featherman and P. A. Pavlou, “Predicting e-services adoption: A
perceived risk facets perspective,” Int. J. Hum.-Comput. Stud., vol. 59,
no. 4, pp. 451–474, 2003.
[70] X. Luo, H. Li, J. Zhang, and J. Shim, “Examining multi-dimensional
trust and multi-faceted risk in initial acceptance of emerging technolo-
gies: An empirical study of mobile banking services,” Decision Support
Systems, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 222–234, 2010.
[71] F. D. Davis, “Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user
acceptance of information technology,” MIS Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3,
pp. 319–340, 1989.
[72] T. Kushwaha and V. Shankar, “Are multichannel customers really more
valuable? The moderating role of product category characteristics,”
Journal of Marketing, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 67–85, 2013.
[73] J. Jacoby and L. B. Kaplan, “The components of perceived risk,” ACR
Special Volumes, 1972.
[74] M. P. Conchar, G. M. Zinkhan, C. Peters, and S. Olavarrieta, “An in-
tegrated framework for the conceptualization of consumers’ perceived-
risk processing,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 32,
no. 4, pp. 418–436, September 2004.
[75] F. Faul, E. Erdfelder, A.-G. Lang, and A. Buchner, “G*Power 3: A
flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral,
and biomedical sciences,” Behavior Research Methods, vol. 39, no. 2,
pp. 175–191, May 2007.
[76] LimeSurvey, “LimeSurvey: The online survey tool - open source
surveys,” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.limesurvey.org/
[77] P. E. Green and V. Srinivasan, “Conjoint analysis in consumer research:
Issues and outlook,” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
103–123, 1978.
[78] F. Eggers and H. Sattler, “Hybrid individualized two-level choice-based
conjoint (HIT-CBC): A new method for measuring preference struc-
tures with many attribute levels,” International Journal of Research in
Marketing, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 108–118, 2009.
[79] J. J. Louviere, T. N. Flynn, and R. T. Carson, “Discrete choice
experiments are not conjoint analysis,” Journal of Choice Modelling,
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 57–72, 2010.
[80] M. I. Alpert, “Identification of determinant attributes: A comparison of
methods,” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 184–191,
1971.
[81] F. Vo¨lckner, “The dual role of price: decomposing consumers’ reactions
to price,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 36, no. 3,
pp. 359–377, September 2008.
[82] S. Barge and H. Gehlbach, “Using the theory of satisficing to evaluate
the quality of survey data,” Research in Higher Education, vol. 53,
no. 2, pp. 182–200, March 2012.
[83] M. B. Holbrook and W. L. Moore, “Conjoint analysis on objects with
environmentally correlated attributes: The questionable importance of
representative design,” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 16, no. 4,
pp. 490–497, March 1990.
[84] A. Scholl, L. Manthey, R. Helm, and M. Steiner, “Solving multiattribute
design problems with analytic hierarchy process and conjoint analysis:
An empirical comparison,” European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 164, no. 3, pp. 760–777, 2005.
[85] M. Thomas and V. Morwitz, “Penny wise and Pound foolish: The left-
digit effect in price cognition,” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 32,
no. 1, pp. 54–64, June 2005.
[86] B. Baumgartner and W. J. Steiner, “Are consumers heterogeneous in
their preferences for odd and even prices? Findings from a choice-
based conjoint study,” International Journal of Research in Marketing,
vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 312–323, 2007.
[87] Sawtooth Software, Inc., “The CBC system for choice-based conjoint
analysis – Version 9,” Sawtooth Software Technical Paper Series, 2017.
[88] J. Pinnell, “Comment on Huber: Practical suggestions for CBC studies,”
Sawtooth Software Research Paper, 2005.
[89] M. Natter and M. Feurstein, “Real world performance of choice-based
conjoint models,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 137,
no. 2, pp. 448–458, 2002, graphs and Scheduling.
[90] K. M. Miller, R. Hofstetter, H. Krohmer, and Z. J. Zhang, “How should
consumers’ willingness to pay be measured? an empirical comparison
of state-of-the-art approaches,” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 48,
no. 1, pp. 172–184, 2011.
[91] J. Huber, D. R. Wittink, J. A. Fiedler, and R. Miller, “The effectiveness
of alternative preference elicitation procedures in predicting choice,”
Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 105–114, 1993.
[92] J.-B. E. Steenkamp and D. R. Wittink, “The metric quality of full-
profile judgments and the number-of-attribute-levels effect in conjoint
analysis,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, vol. 11,
no. 3, pp. 275–286, 1994.
[93] M. Steiner, N. Wiegand, A. Eggert, and K. Backhaus, “Platform
adoption in system markets: The roles of preference heterogeneity
and consumer expectations,” International Journal of Research in
Marketing, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 276–296, 2016.
[94] B. Orme, “Sample size issues for conjoint analysis studies,” Getting
Started with Conjoint Analysis: Strategies for Product Design and
Pricing Research, 2010.
[95] Federal Statistical Office (Germany), “Germany Census 2011,” 2011.
[Online]. Available: https://www.zensus2011.de/EN
[96] ——, “Germany Mikrozensus 2014,” 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://www.gesis.org/en/missy/metadata/MZ/2014/
15
[97] Statista, “Smart home report 2019 – Statista digital market outlook -–
Market report,” December 2018.
[98] B. Orme, “Interpreting conjoint analysis data,” Sawtooth Software
Research Paper, 2002.
[99] A. Lengerer, J. Schroedter, M. Boehle, T. Hubert, and C. Wolf,
“Datenhandbuch GESIS-Mikrozensus-Trendfile: Harmonisierung der
Mikrozensen 1962 bis 2006 (in German),” 2010.
[100] Sawtooth Software, Inc., “The CBC latent class technical paper –
Version 3,” Sawtooth Software Technical Paper Series, 2017.
[101] H. Bozdogan, “Model selection and Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC): The general theory and its analytical extensions,” Psychome-
trika, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 345–370, September 1987.
[102] D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler, “Fairness and the
assumptions of economics,” The Journal of Business, vol. 59, no. 4,
pp. 285–300, 1986.
[103] L. E. Bolton, L. Warlop, and J. W. Alba, “Consumer Perceptions of
Price (Un)Fairness,” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 29, no. 4, pp.
474–491, 03 2003.
[104] N. Koschate-Fischer, I. V. Huber, and W. D. Hoyer, “When will price
increases associated with company donations to charity be perceived
as fair?” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 44, no. 5,
pp. 608–626, Sep 2016.
[105] E. M. Redmiles, M. L. Mazurek, and J. P. Dickerson, “Dancing
pigs or externalities? Measuring the rationality of security decisions,”
in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation, Ithaca, NY, USA, 2018, pp. 215–232.
[106] I. T. Jolliffe, “Discarding variables in a principal component analysis.
I: Artificial data,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series C
(Applied Statistics), vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 160–173, 1972.
[107] R. T. Rust, K. N. Lemon, and V. A. Zeithaml, “Return on market-
ing: Using customer equity to focus marketing strategy,” Journal of
Marketing, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 109–127, 2004.
[108] J. F. Hair, W. C. Black, B. J. Babin, and R. E. Anderson, Multivariate
Data Analysis (7th edition). Englewood Cliffs: Pearson Prentice Hall,
2010.
APPENDIX
A. Marketing Research Scales of Prestudy 1
The scales below were used in Prestudy 1 to compare the
perception of product categories.
• Attitude towards a product category adapted from Martin
et al. [64]
– How favorable are [product]s?
(1 = ‘not at all favorable’ to 7 = ‘very favorable’)
– How likable are [product]s?
(1 = ‘not at all likable’ to 7 = ‘very likable’)
– How pleasing are [product]s?
(1 = ‘not at all pleasing’ to 7 = ‘very pleasing’)
• Involvement with a product category, Mathwick and Rig-
don [65].
‘[Product]s...’
– 1 = ‘Mean nothing to me’ to 7 = ‘mean a lot to me’
‘I find [product]s...’
– 1 = ‘worthless’ to 7 = ‘valuable’
– 1 = ‘boring’ to 7 = ‘interesting’
– 1 = ‘exciting’ to 7 = ‘unexciting’
– 1 = ‘fascinating’ to 7 = ‘mundane’
– 1 = ‘involving’ to 7 = ‘uninvolving’
• Consumption motives, Wakefield and Inman [66]
‘[Product]s are used for ...’
– 1 = ‘Practical purposes’ to 7 = ‘Just for Fun’
– 1 = ‘Purely functional’ to 7 = ‘Pure enjoyment’
– 1 = ‘For a routine need’ to 7 = ‘For pleasure’
• Desirability to possess a product adapted from Lei et al. [67]
– [Product]s are. . . (1 = ‘not at all desirable’ to 7 = ‘very
desirable’)
• Purchase intention adapted from MacKenzie et al. [68] (1
= ‘very low’ to 7 = ‘very high’)
– If I were going to buy a [product], the probability of
buying this model is...
– The probability that I would consider buying this [prod-
uct] is...
– The likelihood that I would purchase this [product] is...
B. Quality Analysis of Perceived Security Risk Scale
We assessed the quality criteria of the perceived security risk
scale based on the results of the conjoint questionnaire, where
the group of 731 respondents (denoted as PC1) evaluated a
product category with a high perceived security risk, and the
group of 735 respondents (denoted as PC2) evaluated a product
category with a low perceived security risk.
First, we evaluated the convergent validity of the perceived
security risk scale using a principal component analysis (PCA)
with Varimax rotation, in order to prove the dimensionality.
For the PCA, the Bartlett test indicated significant correlations,
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling
adequacy with KMO = .898 for PC1 and KMO = .917 for
PC2, and all measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) values
for individual items were greater or equal than .803 for PC1
and .840 for PC2. Thus, KMO and MSA exceed the acceptable
limit of .500 as proposed by Field [63]. Field also suggests
an eigenvalue cutoff, if the sample size exceeds 250 and the
average communality is greater than .6. As both conditions
apply to our case, we used an eigenvalue cutoff of .7, as
proposed by Jolliffe [106]. This procedure is similar to Rust
et al. [107], and helps to provide the best trade-off between
parsimony and interpretability concerning the scale.
The factors of PC1 and PC2 are shown in Table XI. For PC1,
the PCA with Varimax rotation for the 13 perceived security
items revealed four factors for perceived security (variance
explained = 77.94%). For PC2, the PCA with Varimax rotation
revealed three factors (variance explained = 77.14%). Factor
loadings of PC1 and PC2 were greater or equal to .464 (should
be >.400) [108]. For PC1, all items loaded the highest on the
factor (i.e., ‘general’, ‘privacy’, ‘physical’, or ‘financial risk’)
on which they were supposed to load, making all factors easy
to interpret. Thus, the four factors aligned closely with the four
perceived security dimensions that we derived from previous
research. For PC2, the first seven items formed a composite
factor (‘general/privacy risk’), while items 8 to 10 loads on
‘physical risk’, and items 11 to 13 loaded on ‘financial risk’.
The reasons for the loading of the general and privacy risks to
a single factor are not clear, such that the scale may require
further refinement in the future.
Second, we evaluated the perceived security risk scale in
terms of the Cronbach’s alpha, a measure that defines the inner
consistency of a scale, and the item-to-total correlation for
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TABLE VIII: Considered product attributes (n = 29) and their
dual-questioning scores (higher score values indicate a higher
perceived importance for this attribute)
Smart Home Camera
Rank Product Attribute µ σ
1. Price 31.76 12.83
2. Solar panel for energy generation 26.66 12.01
3. Battery lifetime 26.31 11.33
4. Precision level of measurements 23.72 10.98
5. Rain and wind measurements 23.69 10.99
6. Expandability for multiple rooms 23.48 13.06
7. Max. wireless range 23.34 10.17
8. Warning feature (e.g., storm) 22.66 10.59
9. How many days of local weather forecast 22.14 8.80
10. Measurement rate 19.14 10.15
11. Brand/ manufacturer 18.28 10.12
12. Alarm upon preset threshold exceedance 18.03 10.69
13. Seal of technical approval 17.76 10.14
14. Environmental label 17.14 12.23
15. Material of casing 16.62 10.45
16. Color of product 16.03 11.69
17. Alexa compatible 12.34 9.93
18. Accessibility label (fictive) 11.17 6.70
Smart Weather Station
Rank Product Attribute µ σ
1. Price 30.59 12.69
2. Video resolution 26.79 12.22
3. Field of view 26.17 11.60
4. Video frame rate 24.41 11.21
5. Zoom function 23.10 11.85
6. Energy consumption 22.59 10.53
7. Face recognition 22.10 12.19
8. Night vision mode 21.79 9.60
9. Timing function for recordings 20.86 9.16
10. Type of power supply 19.24 8.59
11. Brand/ manufacturer 18.48 11.92
12. Seal of technical approval 18.48 12.21
13. Material of encasement 18.41 10.62
14. Environmental label 17.38 11.68
15. SD card slot 17.21 9.69
16. Color of product 14.52 10.21
17. Accessibility label (fictive) 14.14 8.73
18. Alexa compatible 11.21 9.19
all dimensions. For all factors of PC1 and PC2, Cronbach’s
alpha was above the recommended threshold of .700 (>.804)
and item-to-total correlation higher than the threshold of .500
(>.524), indicating high reliability and internal consistency of
the perceived security risk scale [63].
C. Consistent Akaike Information Criterion
The consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC) is rec-
ommended by Sawtooth Software as measure to decide on the
number of reasonable segments [100] for latent-class analysis.
Due to the sample size (cf. Section VI-C), we were interested
in splitting the respondents into either 2 or 3 groups, for which
the latent-class analysis provided the corresponding proposals.
Each segmentation proposal has a CAIC score. Smaller values
of CAIC are desired [100]. For the segmentation of the
respondents that evaluated the smart home camera, the CAIC
score was 14,162 for 2 groups and 14,307 for 3 groups. For
the segmentation of the respondents that evaluated the smart
weather station, the CAIC score was 14,471 for 2 groups and
14,260 for 3 groups. In summary, for the smart home cameras,
the smaller CAIC score indicated 3 groups, while for smart
weather, the smaller CAIC score indicated 2 groups.
Fig. 2: Screenshot of a choice task in the conjoint question-
naire (translated to English).
TABLE IX: Mean µ and standard deviation σ from Prestudy 1
(n = 30) sorted by perceived security risk.
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Smart Alarm System µ 5.76 4.77 1.74 3.37 4.26 3.90σ 1.33 1.17 1.01 1.57 1.13 1.47
Smart Door Lock µ 5.65 3.16 2.42 2.39 3.22 2.70σ 1.63 1.38 1.43 1.55 1.28 1.34
Smart Home Camera µ 5.49 3.86 3.44 3.02 3.56 3.57σ 1.41 1.82 1.73 1.60 1.41 1.59
Smart Smoke Detector µ 4.12 5.16 1.74 4.27 4.52 4.27σ 1.55 1.34 1.03 1.79 1.30 1.55
Smart Thermostat µ 3.67 5.24 1.72 4.52 4.52 4.67σ 1.61 1.38 0.97 1.69 1.20 1.27
Smart Light Bulb µ 3.40 3.90 4.39 3.24 3.31 3.33σ 1.45 1.48 1.63 1.61 1.41 1.56
Smart Vacuum Robot µ 3.10 4.76 2.30 4.08 4.12 3.97σ 1.67 1.84 1.38 2.09 1.54 1.87
Smart Weather Station µ 2.98 4.38 2.90 3.51 3.75 3.67σ 1.51 1.83 1.47 1.87 1.63 1.69
TABLE X: Post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD) for segmentation.
Smart Weather Station
Groups MD1 p 95%-CI2 d
Age
1 vs 2 2.14 0.14 [−0.51, 4.80] 0.19
1 vs 3 4.12 0.00 [1.68, 6.57] 0.37
2 vs 3 1.98 0.11 [−0.32, 4.28] 0.17
Monthly net income
1 vs 2 146.95 0.50 [−158.63, 452.53] 0.11
1 vs 3 322.04 0.02 [37.85, 606.49] 0.26
2 vs 3 175.09 0.26 [−85.76, 435.94] 0.15
Privacy Concerns
1 vs 2 −0.03 0.97 [−0.37, 0.31] 0.02
1 vs 3 0.28 0.09 [−0.03, 0.59] 0.20
2 vs 3 0.31 0.03 [0.02, 0.60] 0.22
Security behavior
intentions
1 vs 2 0.03 0.89 [−0.12, 0.18] 0.06
1 vs 3 0.23 0.00 [0.09, 0.36] 0.39
2 vs 3 0.20 0.00 [0.07, 0.33] 0.47
Perceived security
risk
1 vs 2 −0.08 0.84 [−0.41, 0.25] 0.05
1 vs 3 0.56 0.00 [0.25, 0.86] 0.36
2 vs 3 0.63 0.00 [0.35, 0.92] 0.31
Notation: 1mean difference, 295%-confidence interval
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TABLE XI: Perceived security risk scale (translated to English) with quality criteria.
# Risk Categoryfrom [69] Item
Product Category PC1
(4 factors, n = 731)
Product Category PC2
(3 factors, n = 735)
If a third party takes unauthorized control over
[product], there is a high risk that...
Factor
loading
Item to
Total
Cronbach’s
alpha
Factor
loading
Item to
Total
Cronbach’s
alpha
1
General
...the consequences are severe. .769 .715
.891
.784 .780
.938
2 ...it leads to high potential of abuse. .835 .790 .817 .812
3 ...it is used for criminal purposes. .750 .768 .792 .795
4 ...a serious security threat exists. .776 .783 .822 .816
5
Privacy
...this has a serious impact on privacy. .583 .596 .787 .809
6 ...they access personal information. .840 .774 .826 .742 .800
7 ...it steals private data. .826 .710 .702 .761
8
Physical
...the health of its owners or other people is at risk. .885 .716
.804
.881 .803
.8769 ...the safety of its owners or other people is at risk. .464 .524 .608 .688
10 ...it has harmful consequences to the physical integrityof its owner or other people. .875 .733 .882 .802
11
Financial
...the owner suffers financial losses. .808 .756 .848 .797
12 ...it is misused for crimes involving financial loss. .799 .737 .886 .716 .781 .906
13 ...it leads to financial loss. .854 .841 .846 .863
Items measured on 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 = ‘strongly agree’.
TABLE XII: Statistical significance and effect sizes (Cohen’s dz) of central product attitudes, purchase intention, and security
risk perception for pairs of product categories (Prestudy 1).
Product
Category 1
Product
Category 2
Attitude ConsumptionMotive
Purchase
Intention Involvement Desirability
Perceived
Security Risk
t(29) dz t(29) dz t(29) dz t(29) dz t(29) dz t(29) dz
Door lock Light bulb -2.266* -0.414 -4.855*** -0.886 -2.762* -0.504 -0.338 -0.062 -2.129* -0.389 5.894*** 1.076
Door lock Home Camera -2.371* -0.433 -4.237*** -0.773 -2.828** -0.516 -1.970 -0.360 -3.496** -0.638 0.637 0.116
Door lock Smoke detector -7.062*** -1.289 2.088* 0.381 -5.130*** -0.937 -4.224*** -0.771 -4.419*** -0.807 5.288*** 0.965
Door lock Thermostat -6.519*** -1.190 2.327* 0.425 -5.884*** -1.074 -4.811*** -0.878 -5.662*** -1.034 5.788*** 1.057
Door lock Vacuum robot -4.636*** -0.846 .388 0.071 -4.809*** -0.878 -2.783** -0.508 -3.532** -0.645 6.462*** 1.180
Door lock Weather station -3.600** -0.657 -1.563 -0.285 -3.063** -0.559 -1.891 -0.345 -3.057** -0.558 7.298*** 1.332
Door lock Alarm system -8.148*** -1.488 2.411* 0.440 -4.463*** -0.815 -5.442*** -0.994 -4.966*** -0.907 -0.928 -0.169
Light bulb Home Camera 0.134 0.024 2.218* 0.405 0.677 0.124 -0.829 -0.151 -0.646 -0.118 -7.024*** -1.282
Light bulb Smoke detector -3.621** -0.661 6.662*** 1.216 -2.425* -0.443 -3.389** -0.619 -2.328* -0.425 -2.397* -0.438
Light bulb Thermostat -4.036*** -0.737 7.515*** 1.372 -3.443** -0.629 -3.931*** -0.718 -3.641** -0.665 -1.164 -0.213
Light bulb Vacuum robot -2.780** -0.508 5.917*** 1.080 -2.281* -0.416 -2.710* -0.495 -1.698 -0.310 1.339 0.244
Light bulb Weather station -1.677 -0.306 4.925*** 0.899 -0.958 -0.175 -1.637 -0.299 -1.095 -0.200 1.948 0.356
Light bulb Alarm system -2.991** -0.546 7.385*** 1.348 -0.432 -0.079 -3.372** -0.616 -1.876 -0.343 -7.225*** -1.319
Home Camera Smoke detector -3.876** -0.708 4.765*** 0.870 -3.850** -0.703 -3.148** -0.575 -2.104* -0.384 4.348*** 0.794
Home Camera Thermostat -4.200*** -0.767 5.208*** 0.951 -5.324*** -0.972 -3.707** -0.677 -3.171** -0.579 5.799*** 1.059
Home Camera Vacuum robot -2.631* -0.480 3.301** 0.603 -3.353** -0.612 -1.995 -0.364 -1.343 -0.245 6.658*** 1.216
Home Camera Weather station -1.354 -0.247 1.468 0.268 -1.313 -0.240 -0.606 -0.111 -0.262 -0.048 7.574*** 1.383
Home Camera Alarm system -2.667* -0.487 5.588*** 1.020 -1.429 -0.261 -2.779** -0.507 -1.109 -0.202 -1.481 -0.270
Smoke detector Thermostat -0.308 -0.056 0.125 0.023 -0.822 -0.150 0.021 0.004 -1.249 -0.228 2.088* 0.381
Smoke detector Vacuum robot 1.054 0.193 -2.009 -0.367 0.436 0.080 1.160 0.212 0.787 0.144 3.288** 0.600
Smoke detector Weather station 2.234* 0.408 -3.504** -0.640 1.797 0.328 2.135* 0.390 1.469 0.268 5.129*** 0.936
Smoke detector Alarm system 1.325 0.242 0.000 0.000 3.005** 0.549 0.923 0.169 0.983 0.180 -6.090*** -1.112
Thermostat Vacuum robot 1.498 0.274 -2.067* -0.377 1.081 0.197 1.347 0.246 2.062* 0.376 2.418* 0.441
Thermostat Weather station 2.592* 0.473 -4.089*** -0.747 2.445* 0.446 2.466* 0.450 2.838** 0.518 3.878** 0.708
Thermostat Alarm system 1.654 0.302 -0.121 -0.022 3.332** 0.608 1.000 0.182 2.316* 0.423 -6.361*** -1.161
Vacuum robot Weather station 1.020 0.186 -1.948 -0.356 1.286 0.235 1.025 0.187 0.712 0.130 0.664 0.121
Vacuum robot Alarm system -0.038 -0.007 2.184* 0.399 2.117* 0.387 -0.539 -0.098 0.205 0.037 -7.084*** -1.293
Weather station Alarm system -1.282 -0.234 3.964*** 0.724 0.477 0.087 -1.829 -0.334 -0.851 -0.155 -8.227*** -1.502
We are looking for pairs of product categories that are statistically significantly different in their security risk perception (criterion C1) and not different in
other factors (criterion C2). Highlighted pairs of product categories fulfill these criteria.
Although we run multiple t-tests on the same data set for criterion C2, we did not perform a Bonferroni correction, because omitting the Bonferroni correction
results in a conservative testing procedure for measuring the similarity of product categories.
Notation: Statistically significant with *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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